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The Broadening Of The Pentagon Papers
Standard: An Impermissible Misapplication Of
The National Security Exception To The Prior
Restraint Doctrine
In the 1971 case of New York Times Co. v. United States,'
the United States government sought to restrain the Washing-
ton Post and the New York Times from printing classified infor-
mation pertaining to the government's decision-making process
during the Vietnam conflict. In deciding the case [hereinafter
referred to as Pentagon Papers], the Supreme Court enunciated
a new first amendment' test for the validity of prior
restraints-suppression of news prior to publication-in cases
involving national security. Although the per curiam opinion
gave no indication of the appropriate standard to apply, Justices
Brennan, White, and Stewart clearly delineated the test in their
concurring opinions. The three Justices held that, to restrain the
press from publishing any article affecting national security, the
government must prove at a minimum that dissemination of the
article will directly and immediately cause inevitable, grave, and
irreparable injury.4 The Justices found such a strict standard
necessary to protect the American people's constitutional right
to know about government activities and to avoid a detrimental
1. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The Supreme Court consolidated two cases, United States v.
New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971), and United States v. Washington Post
Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Court issued a per curiam opinion, five concur-
ring opinions, and three dissenting opinions. See text accompanying notes 27-35 infra.
2. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
." U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
3. The Supreme Court has never specified exactly what constitutes a prior restraint.
The traditional definition is that such restraint is "a formal prohibition on speech,
imposed in advance of utterance or publication." Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 12 HAJv. C.R.-C.L. REv. 519, 520 (1977). For a thorough analysis of the sev-
eral forms prior restraint may take, see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L.
& CONrWMP. PROS. 648, 655-56 (1955).
4. 403 U.S. at 724-40 (Brennan, J., Stewart, J., and White, J., separate concurring
opinions). For a comparison of these holdings, see text accompanying notes 31-33 infra.
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chilling effect upon political speech.5 Despite these compelling
reasons, some lower courts trying subsequent media cases6 have
nevertheless allowed the government to prevail upon a lesser
showing of injury. One such court is the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which in 1972 misinterpreted the relatively new Penta-
gon Papers test in United States v. Marchetti,7 a case involving
release of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) secrets.8 The mis-
use of the test continues and threatens gradually to dissolve the
press's immunity from prior restraint. Recently, the District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin followed similar
reasoning in United States v. Progressive, Inc.,9 where it
enjoined a magazine from publishing the formula for the hydro-
gen bomb. By falling to demand proof of inevitable rather than
merely speculative injury, both courts contradicted the tradi-
tional rule against prior restraint: that only in the rarest situa-
tions should courts allow restrictions on the press prior to publi-
cation.10 Such broadening of the high Pentagon Papers standard
has chilled the quantity and quality of political speech and
endangered press freedom in future national security cases.
This comment examines the history of the national security
exception 1 to the prior restraint rule and discusses the elements
5. Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment tolerates abso-
lutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture
..... "); id. at 728 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring) ("[T]he only effective
restraint upon executive policy and power... may lie in... an informed and critical
public opinion .... "); id. at 730 (White, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring)
("[E]xtraordinary protection against prior restraints [is] enjoyed by the press under our
constitutional system .... ").
6. The scope of this comment is limited to print media and does not extend to
broadcast media because of the special considerations in cases involving radio and televi-
sion broadcasting. The primary difference is the special responsibility placed upon
broadcast media because of the limited number of available frequencies. See Barrow,
The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 HAs-
TNGs L.J. 659 (1975). For a comparison of the different first amendment standards the
Supreme Court has applied, compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1941), with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
7. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
8. A related case was Alfred A. Knopf v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992, reh. denied, 422 U.S. 1049 (1975). The court decided Knopf con-
sistently with Marchetti; see note 36 infra.
9. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (temporary restraining order); No. 79-C-98
(W.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 1980) (preliminary injunction).
10. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("only in exceptional
cases"); see text accompanying notes 15-18 infra. These exceptional situations usually
arise where remedies subsequent to publication would be inadequate.
11. The national security exception allows suppression of government secrets in
peacetime. The related exception for obstruction of military operations is limited to peri-
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of the Pentagon Papers standard in the context of the Marchet-
ti and Progressive opinions. Application of those elements to the
reasoning of the cases demonstrates the failure of these lower
courts to follow the Supreme Court's strict view of when
restraint is justified. Examining the theoretical basis underlying
the first amendment, the comment concludes that strict applica-
tion of the Pentagon Papers standard is essential to continuing
protection of the American people's right to be informed of gov-
ernment activities.1 2
I. THE EvOLUTION OF THE Pentagon Papers STANDARD
Based on the rationale that every person has the right to
form and espouse his individual opinion, the prior restraint doc-
trine states that there will be time after publication to punish
the very few persons who publish material not protected by the
first amendment.13 The doctrine also rests on the premises that
everyone has the right to read published material14 and that
ods of declared war and thus is not a significant threat to free speech. See note 20 infra.
12. See note 14 infra.
13. Blackstone's famous statement against prior restraint summarizes the tradi-
tional English rationale for the doctrine:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but
this consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in free-
dom from censure for criminal matters when published. Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiment he pleases before the public: to forbid
this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN'RaES 151-52 (1765).
14. The American people's right to know-to be informed in order to participate
meaningfully in a democratic society-is an important factor in any press-government
analysis. See generally Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1; Hennings, Constitutional Law: The People's Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667
(1959); Horton, The Public's Right to Know, 77 CASE & Com. 3 (1972); Ivester, The
Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977); Parks, The Open
Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1 (1957); Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73
MICH. L. REv. 971 (1975); Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitu-
tional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952); Comment, The First Amendment and the Public
Right to Information, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 93 (1973).
The American press is a conduit in informing the American public of government
activities. Justice Stewart said in his Pentagon Papers concurring opinion:
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other
areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and
power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an
enlightened citizenry-in an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can here protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it is
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society generally benefits from this exchange of information.15
Originating in the struggle against licensing and censorship in
16th and 17th century England, 16 the prior restraint doctrine
was a response to licensing systems in which the government
required printers to submit all their copy for official approval
prior to publication. 17 The history of the doctrine demonstrates
that one of the primary purposes of the first amendment was to
prevent prior government restraint on publication.18
perhaps here that a press is alert, aware and free most vitally serves the basic
purpose of the First Amendment. For without an informed and free press there
cannot be an enlightened people.
403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
That such was the Founding Fathers' concept of the press is evident from this state-
ment by Thomas Jefferson:
The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first
object should be to keep that right [of free expression].
The way to prevent [errors of] the people, is to give them full information of
their affairs and to contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass
of the people.
H. LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 63 (1950).
Congressional recognition of the importance of access to governmental information
is embodied in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), passed in 1966 to
ensure public access to the information in the custody of all federal agencies. See Davis,
The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967); Gianella,
Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act: A Proposal for Uni-
form Regulations, 23 AD. L. REV. 217 (1971); Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide
and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEx. L. REv. 1261 (1970); Koch,
The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions for Making Information Available to the
Public, 32 MD. L. REV. 189 (1972); Note, The Freedom of Information Act Amendments
of 1974: An Analysis, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 951 (1975); Comment, National Security
Information Under the Amended Freedom of Information Act: Historical Perspectives
and Analysis, 4 Ho~sTRA L. REV. 759 (1976); Comment, In Camera Inspections Under
the Freedom of Information Act, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 557 (1974); Comment, National
Security and the Public's Right to Know: A New Role for the Courts Under the Free-
dom of Information Act, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1438 (1975); Comment, National Security
and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85 YALE L.J. 401 (1976).
15. There are times when the press does not act responsibly and society is harmed
more than helped. See SWAIN, REPORTERS' ETHIbS (1978); Christians, Fifty Years of
Scholarship in Media Ethics, 27 J. COM. 19 (1977); Oakes, The Price of Freedom of the
Press: Responsibility, 50 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 466 (1978).
16. Emerson, supra note 3, at 650-52; Note, Prior Restraint and the Press Following
the Pentagon Papers Cases-Is the Immunity Dissolving?, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 927,
932-33 (1972).
17. One argument for broadening the exceptions to the prior restraint rule is that
the licensing and censorship atmosphere in which the prior restraint doctrine originated
does not exist in modern society. This may be a rationale for the apparent gradual disso-
lution of the prior restraint immunity. See Note, supra note 16, at 933.
18. "In the first place, the main purpose of [the first amendment provisions] is 'to
prevent all such previous restraints upon publication as had been practiced by other
governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be
deemed contrary to the public welfare." Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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Despite the venerability of the prior restraint doctrine, the
United States Supreme Court did not employ the rule until
1931, in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson.19 Although recognizing
the historical guarantee against prior restraint on publication,
Chief Justice Hughes, in dictum, delineated three exceptions.
The first exception, obstruction of wartime military operations, 0
See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) ("[Ilt has been generally, if
not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the [first amendment's] guar-
anty to prevent previous restraints upon publication.").
Adequately defining prior restraint and establishing a workable distinction between
prior and subsequent restraints have been major tasks in the evolution of the prior
restraint doctrine. The Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the distinction in
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975):
[A] free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they
break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always
difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between
legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of
free-wheeling censorship are formidable.
Id. at 559.
First amendment theoreticians, in distinguishing prior from subsequent restraints,
traditionally have emphasized the form which the restraint takes. See T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506 (1970); Note, supra note 16, at 931-32. Others
have contended that the substance of the restraint is more important than its form.
Modern commentators urge that the resultant chilling effect on press freedom is the
most important consideration in determining whether a restraint is prior or subsequent
See generally Litwack, supra note 3; Murphy, The Prior Restraint Doctrine in the
Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 898 (1976); Note, Gagging the
Press Through Participant and Closure Orders: The Aftermath of Nebraska Press Asso-
ciation v. Stuart, 2 U. PUGET SD. L. Rav. 317 (1979). For an eclectic analysis combining
the traditional and modern views, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 724-28
(1978).
Commentators have articulated many reasons for the traditional abhorrence of
prior, as opposed to subsequent, restraints. These include the following: (1) the decision
to restrain often rests with a single government official; (2) the range of expression likely
to be brought under government control with prior restraint is far wider than with subse-
quent restraint; (3) the communication terminates before it even takes place; (4) the
opportunity for public appraisal and criticism is minimal; and (5) the governmental
restraint encourages abuse of the judicial system. See T. EMERSON, supra note 18, at 506;
Note, supra note 16, at 931-32.
19. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The case involved a Minnesota statute which provided that
any person regularly publishing a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper,
magazine or other periodical" was guilty of a nuisance and could be enjoined from pub-
lishing and fined $1,000 or imprisoned up to 12 months. MASON'S MINN. STAT. §§ 10,123-
1 to 10,123-3 (1927) (deleted by official committee, 1941).
20. "No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction
to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the num-
ber and location of troops." 283 U.S. at 716. This exception involves security information
during wartime maneuvers and is thus distinguishable from the national security excep-
tion applicable to peacetime information. The Court quoted from Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919): "When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 4:123
suspends the rule in wartime for matters of military strategy
and troop placement that are vital to national security. The sec-
ond exception, obscene publication,21 allows the prior restraint
of obscene communications that are utterly without redeeming
social importance. The third exception, "incitements to acts of
violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government, '22
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right." 283 U.S. at 716.
Quoting the Schenck passage in Nebraska Press Ass'n, Justice Brennan reviewed
the legal development of the three Near prior restraint exceptions subsequent to that
decision and found that the courts had come to interpret both the obscenity and sedition
exceptions as involving speech not protected under the first amendment. 427 U.S. at 590
(Brennan, J., concurring). Yet, despite the strong language in Schenck, Justice Brennan
then pointed out that the military operations exception "contemplated the possibility
that speech meriting and entitled to constitutional protection might nevertheless be sup-
pressed before publication in the interest of some overriding countervailing interest
..... " Id. at 591. His statement supports the conclusion that constitutional protection,
being applicable in wartime, should extend also to use of the national security exception
in peacetime.
21. Justice Hughes cited no authority when he included obscenity as an exception to
the prior restraint rule. As Justice Douglas observed in The Press and First Amendment
Rights, 7 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 5 (1970), even though commentators many times urged that
the first amendment protected obscenity, the Supreme Court did not squarely decide the
issue until Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth held that the rejection of
obscenity as "utterly without redeeming social importance" was implicit in the history of
the first amendment and that obscenity was therefore not within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech. Id. at 484-85. In the later case of Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965), the Supreme Court set procedural standards to alleviate the dangers
inherent in a prior restraint system. The Freedman Court held that a prompt judicial
determination is necessary to impose a prior restraint and that any restraint prior to
judicial hearing must be brief and aimed solely at preserving the status quo. Id. at 58-59;
see, e.g., Comment, Prior Restraint of Free Speech in Movies, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 331 (1961).
The prior restraint issue has ceased to dominate current obscenity decisions because
courts now focus on the definition of obscenity and simply assume they can restrain
material they find obscene.
22. 283 U.S. at 716. In support of this exception, Chief Justice Hughes cited
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Schenck, however, did not involve prior
restraint; the defendant already had published the pamphlets alleged to be seditious.
Chief Justice Hughes also cited Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418
(1911), which did involve prior restraint. Sedition and syndicalism cases seldom turn on
questions of prior restraint, because speech is generally more difficult to restrain prior to
its occurrence than is printed material. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). Courts have applied the
"clear and present danger" test for inflammatory publications principally in political
radicalism cases, where prior restraint is not generally a primary issue. See generally,
Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Branden-
burg-and Beyond, in FREE SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 302 (P. Kurland ed. 1975); Linde, Clear and Present Danger Reexam-
ined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970).
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limits the rule in sedition and syndicalism cases. These excep-
tions all involve circumstances where a particularly strong pre-
publication showing of harm minimizes the effects of the loss of
press freedom. 3 All three exceptions remain a part of modern
prior restraint analysis. Until 1971, however, the Near dictum
on wartime military operations was the only Supreme Court
authority supporting prior restraint in cases involving national
security. Whether a similar national security exception could be
made in peacetime remained unclear.
After forty years of silence on the matter, the Pentagon
Papers case provided an occasion for the Supreme Court to for-
mulate the peacetime national security exception. In June, 1971,
the New York Times and the Washington Post published por-
tions of a classified study on the decision-making process that
guided American actions in Vietnam. After conflicting lower
court decisions, 4 those courts issued temporary restraining
orders allowing the goverment to appeal prior to publication.
The Supreme Court, taking the cases on certiorari, resolved the
conflict25 in favor of the newspapers. The decision built on Chief
Justice Hughes's first exception to find a fourth exception cover-
23. Professor Tribe, searching for a distinguishing factor present in all exceptions to
the prior restraint rule, rejected the relative importance of the government's interests
and the issue of whether the speech was constitutionally protected. He concluded:
A more satisfactory resolution may be reached by abstracting the general char-
acteristics of constitutionally permissible prior restraints from the list of
exceptions the Court has approved officially or in dictum. The generalization
which emerges from this analysis is a narrow set of circumstances in which the
presumption against prior restraints may be overcome-where the expected
loss from impeding speech in advance is minimized by the unusual clarity of
the prepublication showing of harm.
L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 729.
24. United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971); United
States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The two courts disagreed
primarily on the degree of harm to the United States which might occur if the New York
Times and Washington Post published the material. In New York Times, the court
affirmed the stay pending in camera examination to see if the materials posed "such
grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States." 444 F.2d at 544. The
Washington Post court held the government had not met its burden of showing irrepara-
ble harm to the United States and grave prejudice to defense interests. 446 F.2d at 1328.
25. The Supreme Court heard and decided the cases with exceptional speed due to
the unprecedented nature and political impact of the restraint. A prompt judicial deter-
mination is necessary when a court imposes prior restraint, because of the transient
value of the journalistic product. Yet many felt more time was necessary to consider the
issue fully. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 748-63 (Burger,
C.J., Harlan, J., and Blackmun, J., separate dissenting opinions). See also Kalven, The
Supreme Court: 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HAIv. L.
Rzv. 3, 27-28 (1970).
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ing all information essential to national security, 6 whether the
country is at war or not, but at the same time indicated that the
new exception required a high evidentiary standard.
In a 6-to-3 per curiam opinion,27 the Court held that the
government had not met the burden to overcome the heavy pre-
sumption that prior restraint is unjustified, 8 and vacated the
restraining orders. Of six Justices concurring2 with the per
curiam decision, Justices Black and Douglas took the absolutist
view never to permit prior restraint on publication. 0 Justice
Brennan stated that for a court to issue even an interim
restraining order, the government must prove that publication
"must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause ' 31 an event
similar to the endangering of troops or transports mentioned in
Near.2 Similarly, Justice Stewart and Justice White found prior
restraint appropriate only where publication would "surely
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage" to the
United States or the American people." Justice Marshall, con-
curring, did not discuss the standard of proof that should
apply. Thus, while the per curiam opinion of the Court did not
26. See note 32 infra.
27. 403 U.S. at 714.
28. "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity .... The Government thus carries
a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Id.
29. The dissenting opinions of Justices Burger, Harlan, and Blackmun emphasized
the haste with which the Court decided the case. See note 25 supra. Chief Justice Burger
indicated that the two newspapers had a duty to return stolen government documents,
but withheld an opinion on the merits because of the speed with which the case came
before the Court and was decided. 403 U.S. at 748-52. Justice Harlan criticized the "fren-
zied train of events" of the three-week litigation and asserted that, after an executive
determination, the judiciary cannot redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclo-
sure on national security. Id. at 753, 757-58. Justice Blackmun also indicated that the
Court decided the case too swiftly and without proper analysis of the facts. Id. at 759-63.
30. Id. at 714-24 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring). Justice Black was one of the
most eloquent advocates of the absolutist position. For an elaboration of his absolutist
viewpoint, see Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960). See also Cahn,
Justice Black and First Amendment 'Absolutes': A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
549 (1962). For additional literature on the "absolutes" versus "balancing" dispute, see
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
See also M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDIcIAL REVIEW
(1966).
31. 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
32. See note 20 supra. It was in this manner that the Supreme Court expanded on
the Near military operations exception to find an additional exception for all informa-
tion essential to national security even when the country is not at war.
33. 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart and White, JJ., concurring).
34. Id. at 740-48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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establish a standard of proof to apply in subsequent national
security cases, five of the six concurring Justices advocated a
standard that requires, at a minimum, a showing of direct,
immediate, irreparable, and certain damage in order to restrain
publication., 5
Accordingly, when seeking prior restraint of the press on
national security grounds, the government bears a rigorous stan-
dard of proof. First, it must show that publication will "surely"
or "inevitably" cause public harm. The Supreme Court's use of
this language ensures that mere speculation of harm is not
enough. Second, the government also must prove that the resul-
tant harm will be direct and immediate; this guarantees that
publication cannot be restrained merely because of possible
repercussions that are uncertain or collateral. Third, the govern-
ment bears the burden of proving that the resultant injury is
"grave and irreparable," thus ensuring that it cannot restrain
publication except in cases of actual necessity.
II. THE Marchetti CASE
Despite the five Justices' language calling for strict interpre-
tation of the national security exception, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in the subsequent case of United States v.
Marchetti," unnecessarily broadened the Pentagon Papers
standard to include situations where the causal link was only
speculative. In Marchetti, the circuit court affirmed a lower
court's injunction prohibiting a former CIA agent from violating
35. Justice Brennan, in Nebraska Press Ass'n, interpreted the Pentagon Papers
standard as follows:
Although variously expressed, it was evident that even the exception was
to be construed very, very narrowly: when disclosure "will surely result in
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people" or
when there is "governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevi-
tably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to
imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea" ..... It is thus clear that
even within the sole possible exception to the prohibition against prior
restraints on publication of constitutionally protected materials, the obstacles
to issuance of such an injunction are formidable.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 593-94 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(footnotes omitted).
36. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). The Knopf case
involved the same set of facts and similar issues. Only the Marchetti reasoning is dis-
cussed herein because the Fourth Circuit in Knopf used the same approach to the
national security exception, with Marchetti as precedent. See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v.
Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1974) (Haynsworth, C.J.).
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a secrecy agreement by publishing information he obtained dur-
ing his employment in the CIA.3 7 Chief Judge Haynsworth, rely-
ing on three factors, concluded that the government had over-
come the heavy presumption against prior restraint. The chief
judge reasoned, first, that the government has a right to internal
security about governmental affairs where "disclosure may rea-
sonably be thought to be inconsistent with the national inter-
est."8 8 Second, he stated that although ordinary criminal sanc-
tions might deter unauthorized disclosure of the information,
the risk of harm was so great and maintenance of confidentiality
so vital that "greater and more positive assurance" was war-
ranted. 9 Finally, Chief Judge Haynsworth held that Marchetti
should betray the position of trust in which the government had
placed him.40
In finding that disclosure "may" be inconsistent with the
national interest, the Marchetti court used an ad hoc balancing
approach, balancing the specific governmental security interests
against specific press interests. The court thus came down on
the side of those first amendment analysts who prefer to balance
the interests represented in the specific case; at the opposite
extreme are those, like Justice Black, who believe prior restraint
of protected speech is never proper. "1 The middle ground
between these two extremes, in the Supreme Court majority's
view of the prior restraint doctrine, is "definitional balancing, 4
2
37. 466 F.2d at 1311.
38. Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 1317. See Note, Constitutional Law-Prior Restraint Enforced Against
Publication of Classified Material by CIA Employee, 51 N.C. L. REv. 865 (1973).
40. 466 F.2d at 1313. Marchetti had signed an employment contract with the CIA
which contained a nondisclosure clause. Id. at 1312. Recently the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the importance of such contractual limitations in Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507 (1980). The Court found that an agreement, signed by CIA employee Snepp
when he accepted employment, promising that he would not publish any information or
material relating to the agency without specific prior approval of the agency, was a
fiduciary obligation. Therefore, the Court found that, when Snepp published a book
based on his experiences as a CIA agent in South Vietnam without first submitting it to
the agency for prepublication review, he breached the fiduciary obligation and the Court
impressed the proceeds of his breach with a constructive trust for the government's ben-
efit. The Court also said that whether the employee violated his trust did not depend on
whether his book actually contained classified information but rather on whether he
allowed the CIA to have prepublication review. Id. at 511.
41. See note 30 supra.
42. See Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Unde-
cided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 311, 329 (1974). For a discussion of the use
of definitional balancing in the libel and privacy areas, see Nimmer, The Right to Speak
from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to
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distinguishable from ad hoc balancing in that the court balances
the broad societal interest in free speech against the broad socie-
tal interest in national security, rather than balancing the spe-
cific interests involved in the case. Definitional balancing
restrains otherwise protected speech only when necessary to pre-
vent serious damage. Only the gravest and most irreparable of
harms justify such prior restraint. In balancing governmental
interests against press freedom, it is therefore essential to apply
a weighty evidentiary burden, as the Marchetti court did not do,
to overcome the presumed constitutional invalidity of any prior
restraint. By failing to require the government to prove specifi-
cally that publication would cause harm, the court misapplied
the first element of the Pentagon Papers standard (publication
must inevitably and surely result in harm), lowering the govern-
ment's burden of proof and making future restraint more likely.
The Marchetti court's ad hoc balancing approach contra-
dicts Justice Brennan's commentary on the Pentagon Papers
standard in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.43 Referring to
the Pentagon Papers "heavy presumption""" language, Justice
Brennan wrote:
This does not mean . . . that prior restraints can be justified
on an ad hoc balancing approach that concludes that the "pre-
sumption" must be overcome in light of some perceived "justi-
fication." Rather, this language refers to the fact that, as a
matter of procedural safeguards and burden of proof, prior
restraints even within a recognized exception to the rule
against prior restraints, will be extremely difficult to justify
45
To assume, as the Marchetti court did, that courts should
give as much weight to governmental interests as to press free-
Privacy, 56 CALIr. L. REv. 935 (1968). For a discussion of the use of definitional balanc-
ing in the copyright area, see Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970).
43. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
44. See note 28 supra.
45. 427 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring). In a footnote, Justice Brennan said:
Our language concerning the "presumption" against prior restraints could
have been misinterpreted to condone an ad hoc balancing approach rather
than merely to state the test for assessing the adequacy of procedural safe-
guards and for determining whether the high burden of proof had been met in
a case falling within one of the categories that constitute the exceptions to the
rule against prior restraints.
Id. at 594-95 n.21.
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dom in the balancing process is contrary to this interpretation."
By making the evidentiary burden against prior restraint so dif-
ficult to overcome, the Supreme Court intended to ensure that
chilling of press rights would occur only where proof of great
harm was exceptionally clear. Ad hoc balancing, on the other
hand, dilutes the prior restraint rule because a court can then
restrain publication whenever it decides the justifications for
suppression outweigh the justifications for publication. 7 Proper
application of the evidentiary burden against prior restraint
requires instead that courts presume that injunctions restraining
publication are improper except where absolutely necessary to
prevent harm so substantial as to compare with the results of
disclosing troop placement in wartime. Only a strict interpreta-
tion of the Pentagon Papers standard, requiring proof that pub-
lication will cause inevitable, immediate, and irreparable damage
to the United States, can ensure that this presumption against
prior restraint is upheld.
In addition to its use of ad hoc balancing, the Marchetti
court's failure to look at the reasons behind the government's
classification of the information" or to analyze the underlying
security risks49 further encourages the suppression of material
the government considers embarrassing or publicity-sensitive,
46. The balancing method employed by the Marchetti and Progressive courts,
equally weighing the government's interest against the public's right to be informed,
opposes the Supreme Court's express policy against balancing core constitutional rights
against governmental interests in some specific instances. See, e.g., United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), where, faced with a conflict between a governmental interest
in national security and first amendment rights, the Court declined to "label one as
being more important or more substantial than the other." Id. at 268 n.20.
47. An ad hoc balancing test within the context of a national security situation gives
the court no hard core of doctrine to guide it in reaching a decision, makes factual deter-
minations extremely difficult and time consuming, allows the judicial institution no real
independent judgment, and does not afford adequate notice of the rights essential to be
protected. See Emerson, supra note 30, at 912-14; Litwack, supra note 3, at 548. See also
text accompanying note 37 supra.
48. The court said:
The national interest requires that the government withhold or delete
unrelated items of sensitive information, as it did, in the absence of compelling
necessity. It is enough, as we have said, that the particular item of information
is classifiable and is shown to have been embodied in a classified document.
509 F.2d at 1369.
49. Court analysis of the underlying security risks presents procedural problems
which are not easily solved. Specifically, courts may not have the expertise to make sen-
sitive national security determinations, because of the lack of adequate documentation in
the classification process and lack of technical knowledge. See notes 51 & 52 infra.
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whether or not it is really essential to national security. 0 Classi-
fication systems are admittedly essential to national security
because the government must protect sensitive defense informa-
tion from disclosure to unfriendly foreign powers. 51 Officials,
however, sometimes mechanically refuse to disclose information
simply on the grounds that the government has classified it
"secret" or "top secret." A good argument for this practice is
that one must presume the importance of a particular piece of
classified information because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine its sensitivity without knowledge of related classified
information.' But agencies sometimes classify information
50. In Pentagon Papers, Justice Douglas specified that restraint of publication
would not be tolerated to suppress material that was only embarrassing, as opposed to
material that might adversely affect national security. 403 U.S. at 723-24 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
51. The necessity of some type of classification system is obvious in a world where
highly developed technological warfare has become a reality. See generally, Parks,
Secrecy and the Public Interest in Military Affairs, 26 Gzo. WASH. L. REv. 23 (1957).
Classification of sensitive information prevents leaks about military plans in wartime;
protects contingent war plans in peacetime; provides a certain amount of bargaining
power with other nations, thereby helping diplomatic relations; ensures the flow of intel-
ligence because friendly nations are more apt to share confidential information which
they know can be protected; and encourages frank discussion among bureaucrats in the
decision-making process. See Comment, Developments in the Law-The National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HAlv. L. Rav. 1130, 1190-92 (1972).
The Supreme Court in Pentagon Papers did not denigrate classification as a neces-
sary governmental activity. Justice Stewart aptly reasoned:
[It is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and
the maintenance of an effective national defense require both confidentiality
and secrecy. Other nations can hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere
of mutual trust unless they can be assured that their confidences will be kept.
And within our own executive departments, the development of considered
and intelligent international policies would be impossible if those charged with
their formulation could not communicate with each other freely, frankly, and
in confidence. In the area of basic national defense the frequent need for abso-
lute secrecy is, of course, self-evident.
403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Even so, commentators as early as the 1950's urged that the "[m]ere mention of the
magic phrase 'national security' should not automatically close all avenues of public
enlightenment regarding the conduct of government." Note, Access to Official Informa-
tion: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IN. L.J. 209, 229 (1951). While Chairman of
the Atomic Energy Commission at the height of the cold war, David Lilienthal warned:
"We should stop this senseless business of choking ourselves by some of the extremes of
secrecy to which we have been driven, extremes of secrecy that impede our own technical
progress and our own defense." Id. at 229 n.85.
52. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out in the Marchetti case,
"[wihat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who
has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its
proper context." 466 F.2d at 1318.
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about defense, foreign policy, or internal affairs merely because
it is embarrassing or potentially harmful to specific government
officials, not to the national security, as in the Pentagon Papers
case. 3 Strict judicial interpretation of the Pentagon Papers
requirement of proof of a substantial rather than speculative
link between the publication and the harm to be prevented
ensures that such arbitrary classification cannot be used to
impair press freedom. Yet, where a risk of grave and irreparable
injury to the United States does exist, the government by appro-
priate proof can restrain publication and thereby protect the
American people.
Even where harm is evident, the prior restraint doctrine
requires the application of reasonable alternatives first;" thus,
the Marchetti court erred further in not considering subsequent
criminal sanctions, which if strictly applied might adequately
restrain future disclosure of harmful information. The Supreme
Court, as early as 1907,55 held that the first amendment's main
purpose was the prevention of prior restraint, particularly where
means of subsequent punishment are available and appropri-
ate.50 Otherwise, prior restraint on publication may chill both
the quantity and quality of protected political speech.57 Thus,
53. Procedural improvements in adjudicating the national security exception may
lessen potential embarassment to officials and thus make overcIassification unnecessary.
Because the nature of the restraint on publication requires as swift a determination as
possible, courts should take particular care to ensure a full adversarial hearing. While the
efforts of both press and government to stack experts on each side are probably unavoid-
able, experience indicates that courts should limit these expert opinions to true authori-
ties on the subject and should exclude those government officials who are not technical
experts but whose prestige and popularity might prejudice press defendants. Addition-
ally, the lack of a trial by jury commits evaluation of the facts to the impressions of a
single judge. As one commentator succinctly noted, "[c]ertainly the opinions of one judge
on difficult or novel questions of constitutional law or complex issues of fact are subject
to error." Litwack, supra note 3, at 539. The alternative to trial by judge-trial by
jury-presents serious problems in light of the confidential nature of classified informa-
tion and the difficulty of obtaining the necessary security clearances.
54. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976) (discussion of
the necessity of pursuing all alternatives to pretrial closure restraint of press coverage).
55. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
56. Id. at 462. The Patterson Court stated: "In the first place, the main purpose of
such constitutional provisions [of the first amendment] is 'to prevent all such previous
restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments,' and they do
not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public
welfare." Id.
57. Political speech traditionally has held a high position in the hierarchy of pro-
tected speech because of its importance to a democratic society. Professor Meiklejohn
expressed the rationale behind this policy when he wrote:
[H]ow inadequate, to the degree of nonexistence, are our public provisions for
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the Marchetti court's insistence on restraint of publication as
the sole remedy restricts first amendment rights and impairs
effective and intelligent participation in the democractic
process.58
III. THE Progressive CASE
Following the trend toward expansive interpretation of the
prior restraint doctrine, a United States District Court again
misapplied the Pentagon Papers standard in 1979 in United
States v. Progressive, Inc." In the Progressive case, the Justice
Department first obtained a temporary restraining order and
then a preliminary injunction, on national security grounds, to
stop publication of an article in The Progressive magazine. The
article examined the secrecy surrounding nuclear bomb produc-
tion and included classified information on hydrogen bomb man-
ufacture.6 0 It contained otherwise protected political speech
because The Progressive professedly attempted to publish it
active discussion among the members of our self-governing society. As we try
to create and enlarge freedom, such universal discussion is imperative .... I
am thinking of a self-governing body politic, whose freedom of individual
expression should be cultivated, not merely because it serves to prevent out-
bursts of violence which would result from suppression, but for the positive
purpose of bringing every citizen into active and intelligent sharing in the gov-
ernment of his country.
A. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, in FREE SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1, 16-17 (P. Kurland ed. 1975).
58. Governmental restraint of political speech even for a few days can chill press
freedom, and only a showing of irreparable damage to the American people should jus-
tify such a restraint. L. TRBE, supra note 18, at 731 (quoting Carroll v. Commissioner of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968)).
59. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (temporary restraining order); No. 79-C-98
(W.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 1980) (preliminary injunction).
60. On the magazine's reasons for publishing the article, editor Erwin Knoll
explained:
It was our feeling, last summer, that the Government had invoked secrecy for
thirty years to keep Americans from questioning the nuclear arms race. How
much justification was there for the secrecy, we wondered, and what kind of
information was being withheld that might help people formulate informed
judgments in such vital questions as environmental risks, occupational health
and safety threats, nuclear proliferation and the continuing arms arms race,
and the astronomical costs of the nuclear weapons program?
Knoll, "Born Secret": The Story Behind the H-Bomb Article We're Not Allowed to
Print, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1979, at 13.
Prior to the Progressive case, self-censorship kept the issue out of court. For
instance, in March 1950, Scientific American magazine altered an article on the hydro-
gen bomb to remove potentially sensitive information. Klement, Nuclear Security Laws
Get First Test in Suit Over Article, NAT'L L.J. March 26, 1979, at 26, col. 3.
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only to show the ease of obtaining nuclear information. 1 The
Justice Department gained temporary injunctive relief on the
assertion that publication would endanger national security'2
and began marshaling its case for permanent restraint. Before
the national security issue68 in Progressive could reach a higher
61. The Progressive court, in its decision on the temporary restraining order, was
quick to point out an obvious flaw in the magazine's logic:
Defendants have stated that publication of the article will alert the people
of this country to the false illusion of security created by the government's
futile efforts at secrecy. They believe publication will provide the people with
needed information to make informed decisions on an urgent issue of public
concern.
However, this Court can find no plausible reason why the public needs to
know the technical details about hydrogen bomb construction to carry on an
informed debate on this issue. Furthermore, the Court believes that the defen-
dants' position in favor of favor of nuclear non-proliferation would be harmed,
not aided, by the publication of this article. 467 F. Supp. at 994.
62. Id. at 991.
63. The Progressive case was an unprecedented courtroom test of the injunctive
powers allocated the government in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2281 (1976). Regarding publication, the Act provides:
Whoever, lawfully or unlawfully, having possession of, [or] access to ...
Restricted Data - communicates, transmits, or discloses the same to any...
person . .. with intent to injure the United States ... upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for life, or by for any term of years
or a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten
years, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1976) (emphasis added).
The injunctive power is provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1976):
Whenever in the judgment of the Commission any person has engaged or is
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation of any provision of this chapter ... the Attorney General ... may
make application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or
practices ....
Under this Act, the Attorney General has authority to enjoin dissemination of
restricted data on nuclear weapons that "injure the United States or secure an advantage
to any foreign nation." 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1976).
The legislative history of the Act reveals that its purposes included encouragement
of dissemination of atomic information to American allies, S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3456, 3458, and
increased participation by the private sector in nuclear development, id. at 3458, 3459.
The Act therefore encourages the "dissemination of scientific and technical information
relating to atomic energy." 42 U.S.C. § 2162(b) (1976). However, the sections of the Act
dealing with dissemination of this information specify that communication of restricted
data concerning the design or fabrication of atomic weapons is strictly forbidden. 42
U.S.C. § 2164 (1976). Thus, Congress emphasized the security-sensitive nature of nuclear
design and fabrication information from the birth of the Act, which assigned injunctive
powers to the government to restrain dissemination of such information.
The congressional mandate of the Atomic Energy Act is difficult to counter. In the
Progressive case, however, it is doubtful that The Progressive and its writers had the
requisite intent, under 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1976), to injure the United States. In fact, The
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court, however, the intervening publication of the same informa-
tion in a small Wisconsin newspaper14 mooted the case and
forced the Justice Department to drop its suit. Nevertheless, the
government's preliminary success in enjoining The Progressive's
publication on national security grounds is an unwarranted dilu-
tion of the Pentagon Papers standard. 5
The reasoning of Progressive, like that of Marchetti, follows
a trend toward relaxing the burden of proof in national security
cases. Judge Robert Warren's in camera opinion, 6 believed to
be the only in camera opinion ever published, 7 was unsealed
February 8, 1980, after a prolonged controversy between The
Progressive and the Justice Department.6 Unfortunately it
deals primarily with preliminary issues69 and treats the Penta-
gon Papers standard only in conclusory fashion.7 0 The court's
Progressive argued that because it did not believe the material to be harmful to national
security, it could not have intended to harm the United States.
64. A letter on hydrogen bomb production, with a rough diagram showing a cross-
section of a hydrogen bomb, was published in the Sunday, Sept. 16, 1979, issue of the
Madison Press Connection, a Madison, Wisconsin tabloid with a circulation of 11,000.
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 1979, at 45.
65. See note 17 supra.
66. United States v. Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 1980). See
Progressive Magazine's 'Bombshell' Opinion: Is It Really a Dud?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25,
1980, at 17, col. 1.
67. A court may require government sources to produce documents and may con-
duct its own examination of them in camera to determine whether they are confidential
and whether disclosure would be detrimental to the best interests of the state. Matthews
v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893 (1952). But disclosure, even to the judge in closed
proceedings, is not automatically required in the case of material which the government
alleges contains military secrets. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976),
exempts from mandatory disclosures matters that are "specifically authorized under cri-
teria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy and... are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Execu-
tive order." Id. § 552(b)(1). Section 552(b)(1) exempts those matters that are "classifia-
ble" under the executive order governing the classification of executive branch docu-
ments in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and that have actually been
classified under that executive order, as occurred in Marchetti and Knopf. Classifiable
information stamped "secret" or "top secret" is, in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, presumed to have been classified pursuant to the applicable executive order.
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368 (4th Cir. 1974) (quoting United
States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14 (1926)); Annot., 29 A.L.R. FED. 606
(1976).
68. The dispute was over the classification of certain information in the opinion.
69. These issues include whether the documents cited in the article were in the pub-
lic domain and whether prior release of classified information should be binding on the
government if it is later determined that further release would jeopardize national secur-
ity. See Progressive Magazine's 'Bombshell' Opinion: Is It Really a Dud?, supra note 66.
70. The opinion states only that "the Court finds that publication or other disclo-
sure of the restricted data contained in the . . article ... would likely cause a direct,
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previous opinion71 granting the temporary restraining order,
however, provides insight into the court's method of applying
the standard.72 It indicates that the court failed to hold the gov-
ernment to the necessary burden of proof: in rejecting the gov-
ernment's proposed finding that publication "would" cause
harms the court should have rejected prior restraint because
the government necessarily failed to prove that publication
would surely or inevitably cause harm. In addition, because the
link between publication and nuclear proliferation in Progres-
sive appears far weaker than the connection between publication
and harm found insufficient in Pentagon Papers, the govern-
ment also failed to prove that harm would follow directly and
immediately upon publication. To conclude that harm would
occur directly and immediately, the court had to assume that
foreign powers already having fission capability had largely not
acquired the article's fusion concepts and would then use the
concepts to develop thermonuclear weapons. 74 The court also
had to assume that such a foreign power would have the enor-
mous resources required to apply the information and that the
immediate and irreparable injury to this nation."
71. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
72. That opinion is, in fact, the only record of the court's reasoning in applying the
Pentagon Papers standard.
73. The government's contention appears in Stipulation for Supplemental Record
II, paras. 17-18, reprinted in Brief of Appellant at 40, United States v. Progressive, Inc.,
467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
The Progressive court said: "[Tihe article could possibly provide sufficient informa-
tion to allow a medium size nation to move faster in developing a hydrogen weapon. It
could provide a ticket to by-pass blind alleys. [It] could accelerate the membership of a
candidate nation in the thermonuclear club." 467 F. Supp. at 993-94 (emphasis added).
74. The Progressive court's conclusion that publication would cause direct, immedi-
ate, and irreparable injury also fails to consider that capability to produce nuclear weap-
onry does not necessarily result in actual nuclear proliferation. In a statement to Con-
gress, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance distinguished the concepts, explaining that the
"former concept should not be considered to define proliferation.... [I]t is likely that
many countries have the capability but not the intent to manufacture or otherwise
acquire an explosive device." S. REP. No. 467, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1977) (executive
branch comments on S. 897, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978). The government
asserted that only The Progressive's publication of the article could increase the risk of
capability, not the risk of proliferation. 467 F. Supp. at 993-94. There is, no doubt, some
correlation between production capability and actual nuclear arms proliferation, since a
nation cannot proliferate nuclear weaponry without the capability to produce it. Using
that reasoning, however, the court arguably could restrain publication forever because
there always will be some chance, however slight, that publication might encourage
proliferation. This is precisely the type of unreasonable restraint on publication that the
Pentagon Papers "direct and immediate" element was designed to prevent.
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reduction in developmental time would be material. 5 If the
court found any of these factors absent, it would have had no
grounds to conclude that public harm would result directly and
immediately from the article's publication in The Progressive.
The weakest link in this chain of assumptions is the hypo-
thesis that a foreign power acquiring the fusion concepts would
use them to develop thermonuclear weapons. The court found
only that the article "could possibly" provide sufficient informa-
tion to allow a foreign nation to move faster in developing a
hydrogen weapon.76 Such speculative evidence does not support
the court's finding that publication would cause direct and
immediate harm.
The Correct Application of the Pentagon Papers Standard
Correct application of the Pentagon Papers standard would
require different results in both Marchetti and Progressive.
Because the Marchetti court did not examine the processes
underlying the government's classification of the documents,7 it
is unclear whether the court would have ruled otherwise even
had it required the government to prove that publication would
surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable injury. Gov-
ernment witnesses testified that their decisions on the classifica-
tion of particular information were based on their own recollec-
tions, institutional history, staff reports, and specified classified
reports. 78 Had the court held in camera proceedings to hear fur-
ther evidence on the decisional process underlying government
classification of the documents, it quite probably could have
75. The Progressive specifically argued this point in its brief:
To reach its decision, the district court had to assume that countries with
fission capability have not already acquired the fusion concepts in [The Pro-
gressive's] article, that countries acquiring a fusion capability by virtue of the
. . . article would actually develop thermonuclear weapons, that countries with
the knowledge of the fusion concepts have the immense resources required to
apply them, and that the alleged difference in weapons development time
would be material.
Brief of Appellant at 42-43, United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.
Wis. 1979).
Of course there are situations where additional information may cut developmental
time. For example, information about the American atom bomb given to Soviet intelli-
gence by Klaus Fuchs is estimated to have accelerated Soviet developmental time from
three years to 18 months. L. LAMONTF, DAY OF TRINrry 282 (1965).
76. 467 F. Supp. at 993-94.
77. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
78. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1366 (4th Cir. 1974).
1980]
University of Puget Sound Law Review
found that at least some of the information did not in fact
endanger national security. If the court made this finding, it
would not be able to support prior restraint as to that portion of
the information. Similarly, in Progressive, the government's evi-
dence showed a speculative rather than certain causal connec-
tion.7 9 Thus, a stronger court emphasis on the causal link
between publication and resultant harm would have resulted in
the government's failure to meet its heavy burden of proof.
The precedential effect of these decisions may lead to future
suppression of information not sufficiently security-sensitive to
warrant it. To avoid such a chilling effect on the quantity and
quality of political speech concerning the government's activi-
ties, courts in future prior restraint cases involving national
security must strictly apply the Pentagon Papers standard for-
mulated by Justices Brennan and Stewart. Prior restraint is con-
stitutional only in the rarest cases: where a particularly strong
prepublication showing of harm to the United States minimizes
the loss of press freedom. Requiring the government to prove
each element of the Pentagon Papers standard ensures preser-
vation of precious press rights, whereas an ad hoc analytical
approach overemphasizes governmental interests in specific
cases. Without strict judicial interpretation of the Pentagon
Papers standard, the government will be able to suppress politi-
cal speech; with proper application, however, the courts can pre-
serve both press and governmental interests. The government
will still be able to restrain publication where it can prove direct
and immediate harm to the United States, but courts can pro-
tect press freedom against unnecessary chilling. The American
public then can benefit from the free exchange of political
speech that the first amendment guarantees.
Sherrie L. Bennett
79. See notes 72-74 supra.
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